



**TechRate**  
AUDIT COMPANY

# Smart Contract Security Audit

# Audit Details



Audited project

**DFS MAFIA**



Deployer address

**0x6a540ee12a1df6e1c72d7fa2829c9e52f63a01ec**



Client contacts:

**DFS MAFIA team**



Blockchain

**Binance Smart Chain**



Project website:

**<https://dfs-mafia.com/>**

# Disclaimer

This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice as at the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the below disclaimer below – please make sure to read it in full.

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The analysis of the security is purely based on the smart contracts alone. No applications or operations were reviewed for security. No product code has been reviewed.

# Background

TechRate was commissioned by DFS MAFIA to perform an audit of smart contracts:

<https://bscscan.com/address/0x5DBeaA03927255cA8aF5aD3821B2A170B44a25a5#code>

The purpose of the audit was to achieve the following:

- Ensure that the smart contract functions as intended.
- Identify potential security issues with the smart contract.

The information in this report should be used to understand the risk exposure of the smart contract, and as a guide to improve the security posture of the smart contract by remediating the issues that were identified.

# Contracts Details

## Token contract details for 14.02.2022

Contract name	DFS MAFIA
Contract address	0x5DBeaA03927255cA8aF5aD3821B2A170B44a25a5
Total supply	1,000,000,000,000
Token ticker	DFSM
Decimals	9
Token holders	1,380
Transactions count	14,209
Top 100 holders dominance	97.55%
Liquidity fee	1000
Tax fee	200
Total fees	87430280235945831702
Uniswap V2 pair	0x309118cdad74ab95eb625d649550f90dd077eb3c
Contract deployer address	0x6a540ee12a1df6e1c72d7fa2829c9e52f63a01ec
Contract's current owner address	0x6a540ee12a1df6e1c72d7fa2829c9e52f63a01ec


# DFS MAFIA Token Distribution

The top 100 holders collectively own 97.55% (975,487,343,337.90 Tokens) of DFS MAFIA

Token Total Supply: 1,000,000,000,000.00 Token | Total Token Holders: 1,380

DFS MAFIA Top 100 Token Holders

Source: BscScan.com



(A total of 975,487,343,337.90 tokens held by the top 100 accounts from the total supply of 1,000,000,000,000.00 token)


## DFS MAFIA Contract Interaction Details

Time Series: Token Contract Overview


Wed 15, Dec 2021 - Sun 13, Feb 2022

Token Contract 0x5DBeaA03927255cA8aF5aD382182A170844a25a5 (DFS MAFIA)

Source: BscScan.com



# DFS MAFIA Top 10 Token Holders

Rank	Address	Quantity (Token)	Percentage
1	<a href="#">Null Address: 0x000...dEaD</a>	582,893,415,502.336375032	58.2893%
2	<a href="#">0xdc64396fb0a59c5eea9eb6b27441f8fd1ac14</a>	73,337,545,271.135083532	7.3338%
3	<a href="#">0x7ceb91b2e5b9ef63fd9e8e8ae3e8bef263ce55a7</a>	55,504,623,314.072602716	5.5505%
4	<a href="#">0xf9ea47ecdc4dc17094526fe147428def3aa97b91</a>	33,923,863,408.779323023	3.3924%
5	<a href="#">0xa1d48af0996da97baadf34acbd13275d0443528c</a>	26,418,398,926.175342369	2.6418%
6	<a href="#">0x6a540ee12a1df6e1c72d7fa2829c9e52f63a01ec</a>	18,115,938,851.697611185	1.8116%
7	<a href="#">0x7d3c1d9851ee5e25fa9858d6798bb33aafc29059</a>	16,360,057,059.259831367	1.6360%
8	<a href="#">0xcdcd95b1c98a2e90668eea8193073b96a6305af2</a>	12,645,182,884.307131557	1.2645%
9	<a href="#">0xcf4e123562836162fba60155feef644cea6edb9a</a>	10,720,649,323.449134568	1.0721%
10	 <a href="#">PancakeSwap V2: DFSM</a>	10,218,256,335.464451091	1.0218%



# Contract functions details

- + [Int] IERC20
  - [Ext] totalSupply
  - [Ext] balanceOf
  - [Ext] transfer #
  - [Ext] allowance
  - [Ext] approve #
  - [Ext] transferFrom #
- + Context
  - [Int] \_msgSender
  - [Int] \_msgData
- + Ownable (Context)
  - [Pub] <Constructor> #
  - [Pub] owner
  - [Pub] renounceOwnership #
    - modifiers: onlyOwner
  - [Pub] transferOwnership #
    - modifiers: onlyOwner
  - [Prv] \_setOwner #
- + [Lib] SafeMath
  - [Int] tryAdd
  - [Int] trySub
  - [Int] tryMul
  - [Int] tryDiv
  - [Int] tryMod
  - [Int] add
  - [Int] sub
  - [Int] mul
  - [Int] div
  - [Int] mod
  - [Int] sub
  - [Int] div
  - [Int] mod
- + [Lib] Address
  - [Int] isContract
  - [Int] sendValue #
  - [Int] functionCall #
  - [Int] functionCall #
  - [Int] functionCallWithValue #
  - [Int] functionCallWithValue #
  - [Int] functionStaticCall
  - [Int] functionStaticCall
  - [Int] functionDelegateCall #
  - [Int] functionDelegateCall #
  - [Int] verifyCallResult
- + [Int] IUniswapV2Router01
  - [Ext] factory

- [Ext] WETH
  - [Ext] addLiquidity #
  - [Ext] addLiquidityETH (\$)
  - [Ext] removeLiquidity #
  - [Ext] removeLiquidityETH #
  - [Ext] removeLiquidityWithPermit #
  - [Ext] removeLiquidityETHWithPermit #
  - [Ext] swapExactTokensForTokens #
  - [Ext] swapTokensForExactTokens #
  - [Ext] swapExactETHForTokens (\$)
  - [Ext] swapTokensForExactETH #
  - [Ext] swapExactTokensForETH #
  - [Ext] swapETHForExactTokens (\$)
  - [Ext] quote
  - [Ext] getAmountOut
  - [Ext] getAmountIn
  - [Ext] getAmountsOut
  - [Ext] getAmountsIn
- + [Int] IUniswapV2Router02 (IUniswapV2Router01)
- [Ext] removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
  - [Ext] removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
  - [Ext] swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
  - [Ext] swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens (\$)
  - [Ext] swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens #
- + [Int] IUniswapV2Factory
- [Ext] feeTo
  - [Ext] feeToSetter
  - [Ext] getPair
  - [Ext] allPairs
  - [Ext] allPairsLength
  - [Ext] createPair #
  - [Ext] setFeeTo #
  - [Ext] setFeeToSetter #
- + BaseToken
- + LiquidityGeneratorToken (IERC20, Ownable, BaseToken)
- [Pub] <Constructor> (\$)
  - [Pub] name
  - [Pub] symbol
  - [Pub] decimals
  - [Pub] totalSupply
  - [Pub] balanceOf
  - [Pub] transfer #
  - [Pub] allowance
  - [Pub] approve #
  - [Pub] transferFrom #
  - [Pub] increaseAllowance #
  - [Pub] decreaseAllowance #
  - [Pub] isExcludedFromReward
  - [Pub] totalFees
  - [Pub] deliver #
  - [Pub] reflectionFromToken

- [Pub] tokenFromReflection
- [Pub] excludeFromReward #
  - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] includeInReward #
  - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Prv] \_transferBothExcluded #
- [Pub] excludeFromFee #
  - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Pub] includeInFee #
  - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] setTaxFeePercent #
  - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] setLiquidityFeePercent #
  - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Pub] setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled #
  - modifiers: onlyOwner
- [Ext] <Fallback> (\$)
- [Prv] \_reflectFee #
- [Prv] \_getValues
- [Prv] \_getTValues
- [Prv] \_getRValues
- [Prv] \_getRate
- [Prv] \_getCurrentSupply
- [Prv] \_takeLiquidity #
- [Prv] \_takeCharityFee #
- [Prv] calculateTaxFee
- [Prv] calculateLiquidityFee
- [Prv] calculateCharityFee
- [Prv] removeAllFee #
- [Prv] restoreAllFee #
- [Pub] isExcludedFromFee
- [Prv] \_approve #
- [Prv] \_transfer #
- [Prv] swapAndLiquify #
  - modifiers: lockTheSwap
- [Prv] swapTokensForEth #
- [Prv] addLiquidity #
- [Prv] \_tokenTransfer #
- [Prv] \_transferStandard #
- [Prv] \_transferToExcluded #
- [Prv] \_transferFromExcluded #

(\$ ) = payable function

# = non-constant function

# Issues Checking Status

Issue description		Checking status
1.	Compiler errors.	Passed
2.	Race conditions and Reentrancy. Cross-function race conditions.	Passed
3.	Possible delays in data delivery.	Passed
4.	Oracle calls.	Passed
5.	Front running.	Passed
6.	Timestamp dependence.	Passed
7.	Integer Overflow and Underflow.	Passed
8.	DoS with Revert.	Passed
9.	DoS with block gas limit.	Low issues
10.	Methods execution permissions.	Passed
11.	Economy model of the contract.	Passed
12.	The impact of the exchange rate on the logic.	Passed
13.	Private user data leaks.	Passed
14.	Malicious Event log.	Passed
15.	Scoping and Declarations.	Passed
16.	Uninitialized storage pointers.	Passed
17.	Arithmetic accuracy.	Passed
18.	Design Logic.	Passed
19.	Cross-function race conditions.	Passed
20.	Safe Open Zeppelin contracts implementation and usage.	Passed
21.	Fallback function security.	Passed

# Security Issues

## ✓ High Severity Issues

No high severity issues found.

## 📊 Medium Severity Issues

No medium severity issues found.

## ✓ Low Severity Issues

### 1. Out of gas

Issue:

- The function `includeInReward()` uses the loop to find and remove addresses from the `_excluded` list. Function will be aborted with `OUT_OF_GAS` exception if there will be a long excluded addresses list.

```
function includeInReward(address account) external onlyOwner() {
    require(!_excluded[account], "Account is already excluded");
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < _excluded.length; i++) {
        if (_excluded[i] == account) {
            _excluded[i] = _excluded[_excluded.length - 1];
            _tOwned[account] = 0;
            _isExcluded[account] = false;
            _excluded.pop();
            break;
        }
    }
}
```

- The function `_getCurrentSupply` also uses the loop for evaluating total supply. It also could be aborted with `OUT_OF_GAS` exception if there will be a long excluded addresses list.

```
function _getCurrentSupply() private view returns (uint256, uint256) {
    uint256 rSupply = _rTotal;
    uint256 tSupply = _tTotal;
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < _excluded.length; i++) {
        if (
            _rOwned[_excluded[i]] > rSupply ||
            _tOwned[_excluded[i]] > tSupply
        ) return (_rTotal, _tTotal);
        rSupply = rSupply.sub(_rOwned[_excluded[i]]);
        tSupply = tSupply.sub(_tOwned[_excluded[i]]);
    }
    if (rSupply < _rTotal.div(_tTotal)) return (_rTotal, _tTotal);
    return (rSupply, tSupply);
}
```

Recommendation:

Check that the excluded array length is not too big.

## Owner privileges (In the period when the owner is not renounced)

- Owner can change the tax and liquidity fee.

```
function setTaxFeePercent(uint256 taxFeeBps↑) external onlyOwner {
    _taxFee = taxFeeBps↑;
    require(
        _taxFee + _liquidityFee + _charityFee <= 10**4 / 4,
        "Total fee is over 25%"
    );
}

ftrace | funcSig
function setLiquidityFeePercent(uint256 liquidityFeeBps↑)
    external
    onlyOwner
{
    _liquidityFee = liquidityFeeBps↑;
    require(
        _taxFee + _liquidityFee + _charityFee <= 10**4 / 4,
        "Total fee is over 25%"
    );
}
```

- Owner can exclude from the fee.

```
function excludeFromFee(address account↑) public onlyOwner {
    _isExcludedFromFee[account↑] = true;
}
```

# Conclusion

Smart contracts contain low severity issues! Liquidity pair contract's security is not checked due to out of scope.

Liquidity locking details provided by the team:

<https://deeplock.io/lock/0x309118CdaD74ab95Eb625d649550F90Dd077EB3c>

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## *TechRate note:*

*Please check the disclaimer above and note, the audit makes no statements or warranties on business model, investment attractiveness or code sustainability. The report is provided for the only contract mentioned in the report and does not include any other potential contracts deployed by Owner.*